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TRAVAIL, capital et société 44:2 (2011)

Travail informel en Inde et en Indonésie : surmonter les
obstacles à la syndicalisation
John Folkerth and Tonia Warnecke
Résumé

Pour faciliter la transformation vers une société plus juste
et équitable, il serait important de promouvoir les conditions de
travail décentes par l’adoption de normes du travail. Des millions
d’ouvriers dans le monde doivent pourtant se contenter d’emplois
informels incertains et mal protégés. Cet article étudie les différentes
approches de syndicalisation de ces travailleurs, considérant cet
agent de changement comme un outil important pour améliorer
leurs conditions de travail. La nécessité s’en fait d’autant plus
sentir en l’absence générale d’efforts pour respecter les lois sur le
travail dans les pays en développement. Les syndicats et les ONG
peuvent contribuer à favoriser des conditions de travail décentes
tout en sensibilisant la population aux problèmes des travailleurs
et en faisant des pressions politiques pour accroître les capacités
d’exécution des normes de travail. La pression exercée pour faire
respecter les lois sur le travail peut ainsi être répartie entre diverses
couches de la société civile. À cette fin, nous analysons l’Indonésie et
l’Inde, deux pays d’Asie où les secteurs d’emploi informel prennent
des proportions particulièrement importantes. Ce faisant, nous
mettons en valeur l’éventail de stratégies possibles pour réussir à
syndicaliser les travailleurs du secteur informel. Nous montrons
aussi que des obstacles similaires à la syndicalisation du secteur
informel peuvent emprunter des formes différentes d’un pays à
l’autre, selon les structures institutionnelles et les normes culturelles
de chaque pays.
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Informal Labour in India and Indonesia:
Surmounting organizing barriers
John Folkerth1 and Tonia Warnecke2
Abstract
A key aspect of facilitating a transformation to a more just
and equitable society should be the facilitation of decent work,
through the adoption of labour standards. Yet the majority of
workers in the global South are engaged in vulnerable, informal
work that offers very little (if any) welfare protection While there
are many possible ways to improve the conditions of work in the
informal sector, this paper focuses on organizing workers as an
agent for change. Organizing the informal sector is particularly
important given the general lack of labour law enforcement in the
developing world; unions and non-governmental organizations
can work to support decent work conditions while raising public
awareness of labour issues and lobbying for increased enforcement
capacity. The pressure to enforce labour laws and regulations can
thus spread through multiple levels of civil society. Toward this end,
we undertake an analysis of two Asian countries with particularly
high proportions of informal sector employment—Indonesia and
India. In so doing, we highlight the variety of possible strategies
for successfully organizing informal sector workers, and we also
show that similar barriers to organizing the informal sector may be
manifested differently across countries according to country-specific
institutional structures and cultural norms.
Introduction
Around the world most labour market statistics reflect
formal sector work—work which is standard, typical, and permanent
(in either the public or private sphere). We know the most about
this type of work) because it is regulated, taxed, and measured in
a variety of ways. In the developed world, informal work (often
characterized as non-standard, atypical, and temporary) is atypical in
the sense that it represents a minority of the work performed. Yet, in
the developing world the opposite is true and informal employment
comprises one-half to three-quarters of non-agricultural work, as

well as the majority of agricultural labour (International Labour
Organization [ILO], 2002). Informal workers generally fall outside
of the government purview of tax, social contributions, and labour
laws, so it is difficult to track these workers or protect them in the
usual (legal) ways (De Ruyter et al., 2009)3.
Although exceptions exist, informal employment is largely
vulnerable employment, and because of this informal work is generally
not considered ‘decent work’. Decent work, as conceptualized by
the International Labour Organization (ILO), promotes “inclusivity
and productivity in the workplace” by requiring decent wages, safe
working conditions, and regulated working hours, among other
things (ILO, 2010a). As such, decent work “is a source of personal
dignity, family stability, peace in the community, democracies that
deliver for people, and economic growth that expands opportunities
for productive jobs and enterprise development” (ILO, 2010a).
Decent work also fosters positive economic freedom by enabling
capabilities to better participate in market economies, in accordance
with Sen’s capability endowment approach (see Warnecke & De
Ruyter, 2010).
While there are many possible ways to improve the
conditions of work in the informal sector (De Ruyter et al., 2009), this
paper focuses on one particular method: organizing workers in the
informal sector. Organizing the informal sector is a political process
aiming to empower workers and create substantive gains and lasting
change in their lives. However, organizing this sector is difficult,
and necessitates power struggles against the state, employers, and
sometimes, other workers. Our overarching goal is to elucidate
common barriers to organizing the informal sector, and discuss
best practices for overcoming them. We undertake an exploratory
analysis of two Asian countries with particularly high proportions
of informal sector employment in their societies -- Indonesia and
India. In so doing, we highlight the variety of possible strategies for
successfully organizing informal sector workers. We also show that
similar barriers to organizing the informal sector may be manifested
differently across countries according to country-specific institutional
structures, culture, and other factors.
The Informal Sector and the Global Economy
By providing cheap labour to sustain profitable economic
activity, the informal sector supports economic growth (De Ruyter
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et al., 2009). Yet it often does so invisibly, unassisted by economic
policies aimed at the formal sector. The diversity of the informal
sector should not be understated as it encompasses a wide range of
market activities that reside outside the conventional scope of labour
practices. Informal sector workers can be employed by unregistered
informal enterprises, or can be owner operators, self-employed, or
unpaid family workers. They can be temporary or part-time workers,
casual day workers, contract workers, industrial outworkers, or
unregistered workers (ILO, 2002). They are located in rural and
urban areas, and can be members of a variety of demographic
groups—though women constitute the majority of informal sector
workers in most developing countries (Ibid.).
What most informal workers do share, though, is
vulnerability—vulnerability to harsh working conditions, low
wages, and limited upward mobility. This vulnerability disempowers
informal workers and erodes their personal dignity, and prevents
them from achieving their full potential in their family, community,
society, and economy. Yet vulnerable employment has comprised
more than half of all global employment over the last decade (as
shown in Table 1). As defined by the ILO, vulnerable employment
refers to select informal sector groups – contributing family workers
and own-account workers. These groups are not engaged in a
Table 1. Global Employment Trends, selected years from
1998 to 2009
World Vulnerable Employment as share of total employment (%)
Total
Female
1999
53.3
55.9
2007
50.6
52.6
2009
52.8
54.3
World Working Poor (millions)
US$1.25 per day
US$2 per day
1998
945
1429
2008
633
1185
2009
849
1368
World Working Poor (% share of total employment)
US$1.25 per day
US$2 per day
1998
37.5
56.7
2008
21.2
39.7
2009
28.3
45.6
Source: ILO, 2010b; ILO 2010c.
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wage-employment relationship, and are less likely to benefit from
safety nets that guard against loss of incomes during economic
hardship (ILO, 2009)4.
While informal work is often considered entrepreneurial
(thus having a positive connotation), common practices of evading
taxes and avoiding labour regulations are ultimately a detriment
to the state (and society as a whole). Furthermore, many informal
workers occupy their positions due to economic desperation and
lack of alternatives. Perhaps this helps to explain why informal
sector workers comprise a significant portion of the working poor
(Heintz and Vanek, 2007). An informal sector job may be better
than no job at all (monetarily-speaking), but the fact that nearly half
of all global workers still live on less than $2 US per day (see Table
1) shows that this is not a sufficient argument for maintaining the
status quo. For both social and economic reasons, it is crucial to
improve the quality of daily life for the millions of people working
in the informal sector around the world5. Organizing informal sector
workers is one possible strategy for improving labourers’ socioeconomic welfare.
Organizing the Informal Sector
Individual informal sector workers have very little
bargaining power over their wages or work conditions, due to that
fact that informal labour lies outside the scope of formal regulation.
Some informal labour is unskilled, and unskilled workers are often
considered interchangeable – so employers are more likely to fire a
worker for protesting than to take the worker’s concern seriously.
However, some informal workers are skilled, and were pushed out
of their formal sector jobs in order to “reorganize production into
small, decentralized and more flexible units” (Women in Informal
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), 2011: np; Piore
and Sabel, 1984). Since the 1980s, many standard jobs with salary
and benefits have been transformed into jobs with hourly wages and
few benefits, piece rate jobs without benefits, or subcontracted jobs,
firmly establishing the informal sector economy as a permanent
feature of capitalist development (WIEGO, 2011). Economic crises
and the process of economic globalization have contributed to this
trend (WIEGO, 2011).
In many (but not all) cases, the informal worker’s lack
of power corresponds to his or her isolation from others; many
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types of informal work (particularly piece-work in one’s home,
but also scavenging for metal scraps, domestic work, etc.) occur
in environments where there is no interaction between informal
workers (Wikramasekera, 2002; ILO, 2003). It is precisely because
of this correlation between powerlessness and isolation that the
organization of informal workers can help, and there is strength in
numbers.
The goal of organizing the informal sector is to improve the
daily life of informal sector workers by increasing wages, reducing
work hours, providing health insurance or education, or guaranteeing
a street vendor a space from which to sell (among other things).
Even small improvements can make a big difference to the lives of
informal workers. Yet many attempts to organize workers focus only
on the organizing process itself – the first step of which is identifying
and assembling people who share common goals or needs. While
this task is crucial (and difficult in and of itself, as discussed in the
following section), successful organization of the informal sector
requires an external program in addition to an internal one (Global
Labour Institute, 1999). The internal program “focuses on what the
labour movement itself has to do to improve its capacity to organize
and represent informal sector workers,” while the external program
“consists of the demands directed outside of the labour movement
(to employers, public authorities, international organizations, etc.)”
(Global Labour Institute, 1999: 7-8).
In other words, successful organizing needs to ensure
the building of networks at multiple levels—local, national, and
international—so that the informal sector group not only recognizes
itself, but also is recognized by policymakers (if the group is not
recognized, it will not be able to effectively bargain for change).
Networks can include government bodies, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), international policy-making organizations
and private sector organizations. So that the organization can better
meet the multifaceted needs of the working poor, networks should
also include educational institutions (Marshall, 2010). Effective
organizing of the informal sector is thus more complicated than it
might first appear.
Barriers to Organizing the Informal Sector
Perhaps the most fundamental barrier to organizing the
informal sector is the sheer lack of data on informal sector workers.
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Since most official labour market statistics do not include the
informal sector, basic questions about these workers (who, where,
and how many?) are not straightforward to answer. Yet in order to
organize a group of workers, there must be an identifiable group to
organize.
Even if one can identify informal sector workers, in order
to organize them some sort of collective identity must be present.
While it is often taken for granted that this exists among workers,
this is a mistake, particularly in the informal sector. Informal workers
“go where the work takes them, which means such workers are
constantly on the move” (Handique, 2009: 2). Most informal work
is not associated with a particular address in the same way that—for
example—a bank teller in the formal sector is likely associated with
a particular bank branch. As a result, many informal sector workers
do not have a specific ‘workplace’ they identify with, or ‘co-workers’
with whom to discuss their jobs. Some informal sector workers do
not even consider their activities to be ‘work’ at all, and instead
simply see their activities as part of their daily existence (Wulandari,
2008). As De Ruyter et al. (2009) point out, “Why would someone
join a union if s/he does not believe s/he is a worker?”
The ability to establish a collective identity is also impeded
by the great diversity within the informal sector. Informal sector
workers can be domestic helpers, scrap collectors, or street vendors;
they might work in a factory or a small, unregistered business.
These groups of workers do not always share the same needs.
Some informal sector jobs are considered ‘better’ than others, and
these jobs often are distributed according to existing racial, ethnic,
gender-based, and religious hierarchies (Menon, 2010). So labour
markets, particularly those in developing countries, are highly
characterized by internal divisions—divisions not only between
formal and informal sector workers, but also between different types
of informal sector workers. This complicates efforts to organize the
sector. Is it better to organize one segment of the informal sector
(e.g. one ‘profession’) at a time?
A variety of governmental barriers can also hinder workers’
attempts to organize. For example, states may wish to court foreign
direct investment by enabling least-cost production to occur (without
bargaining over wages, etc.). The proliferation of export-processing
zones (EPZs) throughout the developing world is one case in point.
EPZs are entitled to several government concessions, including
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evasion of wage and labour laws, so that they can better contribute
to short-run economic growth (Engman et al., 2007). Even where
organizing is legally permitted, the lack of enforcement capacity
(and/or the lack of will to enforce regulations) in many developing
countries facilitates egregious violations from employers (Elliott,
2004). Therefore, legalistic solutions alone cannot adequately
support labour organizing (in either the formal or informal sector).
Finally, there are territorial issues involved in organizing,
since the task of organizing workers has long been dominated by
trade unions focused on formal sector employees. These trade
unions have long “neglected the informal economy for several
reasons…[including] the ease of organizing formal sector workers…
the high costs of organizing workers in the informal sector and the
perception or expectation that over time the informal sector will
be absorbed into the formal sector” (Sundar, 2010: 4). However,
the wage differentials for union members led to the shift of job
creation in favour of informal, contractual labour that was less easily
unionized (Sundar, 2003). The immense (and lasting) growth of
the informal sector and the “trade unions’ dwindling numbers in the
formal sector” have led to a sort of identity crisis for traditional trade
unions (Sundar, 2003). Tensions thus emerge between traditional
trade unions and the newer groups or unions attempting to organize
informal sector workers (Sundar, 2009). Should informal sector
workers be absorbed into traditional trade unions or have their
own organizations for representation and bargaining? These are
important questions without a simple answer.
Country Studies of Informal Labour: India and Indonesia
It is also worth asking whether the barriers to organizing are
the same across countries, or whether the barriers differ depending on
cultural or institution-specific factors. A related question is whether
best practices for organizing are universal or differ across countries.
To investigate these issues, we conducted an exploratory analysis of
two developing countries with a high proportion of informal workers
as a proportion of all workers—India and Indonesia. In 2009 62.1
per cent of all workers in Indonesia were informal workers (ILO,
2010d). The incidence of informal labour is even higher in India
where in 2009, 86.1 per cent of total employment was located in the
informal sector (ILO, 2010e). Organizing the informal sector could
thus benefit a massive number of people as 432 million Indians and
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64.8 million Indonesians worked in the informal sector in 2009 (ILO
2010d; 2010e).
India

Only nine per cent of all workers are unionized in India,
though 66,000 trade unions are registered in the country (Handique,
2009). While labor laws provide a degree of protection, in practice
this has not translated into the right to strike or bargain effectively.
First, even though the law recognizes the right to collective
bargaining, employers are not legally required to recognize a union
or to engage in collective bargaining (International Trade Union
Confederation [ITUC], 2011a). There are also multiple restrictions
on bargaining and strike activity, particularly for civil servants and
public service workers; in 2003 the Indian Supreme Court affirmed
that government workers could not strike under any circumstances
(Nkabinde, 2009). For other workers, strikes can be restricted or
prevented depending on the objective, level, or scope of the strike
(ITUC, 2011a).
Another problem is the difficulty of enforcing laws in the
informal sector, which leaves many workers vulnerable to labor law
violations or omitted from their coverage altogether. Furthermore,
laws relating to work conditions only apply to firms of at least 10 or
20 workers, and laws relating to terms of employment and procedures
for disciplinary action and layoff compensation only apply to larger
firms of 50 or 100 workers (Sankaran, 2007). By simply tailoring
their firm size, it is easy for employers to avoid being hampered by
labour regulations.
Given heightened international competition, the Indian
federal government has faced conflicting pressures: to avoid making
“labour reforms concerning the organized sector and at the same
time design policies to ensure welfare of millions of workers in
the informal economy” (Sundar, 2010: 2). One response has been
to shift most labour reforms from the federal government to state
governments, since “the state governments are in a position to make
its own labour laws on certain matters and make amendments to
central laws (owing to distribution of powers under the Constitution
of India)” (Sundar, 2010: 2). This means that different states in India
have vastly different regulatory systems for labour.
Some states (such as Kerala) are known for intervening
on behalf of informal sector workers (Waite, 2001). Others do
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the opposite, relaxing labour inspection systems, exempting
certain economic sectors from labour laws, or reclassifying certain
occupations so that they fall outside the purview of existing labour
laws (Sundar, 2010). In Delhi, for example, unions were barred
from the expansive construction site for the Commonwealth Games
Village in 2009, as the administration feared unionization could
delay completion of the project (Handique, 2009). Workers at that
site were also rotated every two months so that labour laws could
not be applied (Ibid.). Without access to the construction workers,
unionization is nearly impossible in these locations, and it is clear
that labour regulation is needed. A survey of more than 18,000
construction workers in the Delhi region showed that less than 10 per
cent of them earn the regional minimum wage (Handique, 2009).
Indian trade unions have tried to pressure state and national
authorities to improve the system of labour laws and enforcement
of those laws. Also, in recognition that their main ‘consumer’ base
(the formal sector) was quickly eroding, the major trade unions
began to reach out to informal sector workers in the 1980s (Sundar,
2003). For example, in Orissa, the Building and Woodworkers
International Union formed self-help groups and cooperatives;
and in Bangalore and Hyderabad, the Union Network International
offered information technology training (Ahn, 2008). Other plans
aimed “to create organizing units in the union federation for
informal sector workers … [to extend] legal aid to informal sector
workers … [and to] organize various forms of public demonstrations
to sensitize the societal agencies about the problems of [informal]
workers” (Sundar, 2003: 7). While not all efforts were successful,
membership in traditional trade unions doubled in India in the early
2000s, primarily due to the increasing unionization of informal
agricultural and rural workers (Sundar, 2010: 4).
One might argue that non-traditional unions (such as those
focused primarily on informal workers) have been even more
successful at pressuring Indian policymakers for change, with the
Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) playing the strongest
role. SEWA’s roots can be traced to the Textile Labour Association
(TLA), the largest and oldest union of textile workers in India. The
TLA formulated a ‘women’s wing’ in 1954, and by the late-1960s,
TLA had developed training programs for the wives and daughters of
mill workers, focusing on embroidery, weaving, and typing, among
other activities (SEWA, 2009b). In the early 1970s, Ela Bhatt—an
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attorney and the head of the Women’s wing of TLA—learned of a
survey probing the exploitation of women workers, revealing, “the
large numbers [of workers] untouched by unionization government
legislation and policies” (SEWA, 2009a). After visiting groups of
female cart-pullers, head-loaders and used-garment-sellers and
hearing their stories, Bhatt founded SEWA in 1971 in response to
appeals from the women (SEWA, 2009a).
It was a struggle for the workers’ association to gain status
in India as a trade union as “[t]he Labour Department refused to
register SEWA because they felt that since there was no recognized
employer, the workers would have no one to struggle against”
(SEWA, 2009a). However, persistence paid off and in 1972 SEWA
was recognized as a trade union. In 1973 the organization had 370
members, but membership grew quickly since there were so many
workers unrepresented by traditional trade unions such as TLA.
While the divergence of interests of formal and informal sector
workers led SEWA to an acrimonious split from TLA in the 1980s,
this spurred even more growth for SEWA, as the organization was
able to create its own ‘brand’ of organizing.
SEWA’s early struggles for higher wages were largely
unsuccessful since there were few jobs but a seemingly unlimited
supply of individuals wanting to work. This led to a strategy
shift, wherein SEWA focused on developing more employment
opportunities for rural workers as well as supporting “long-term,
structural and social changes needed to seriously change women’s
lives” (Rose, 1992: 22; See Wakai, 1994).
With this multidimensional approach SEWA has been
successful on many fronts, particularly in terms of cultivating and
supporting a collective identity among its members. It organizes a
wide variety of occupations, from home-based workers to vendors,
from service providers to farmers (Wakai, 1994). It has successfully
blurred class identification, organizing “both self-employed women
(part of the petty bourgeoisie) and wage-worker women (part of the
working class)” (Selcuk, 2005: 4). It has even overcome religious
differences (members come from a variety of minority groups
with different beliefs) by promoting rehabilitation, education, and
‘mutual helping’ among members since most are discriminated
against in some way (Marshall, 2010). These achievements should
not be understated since the caste system in India still plays a major
role in determining the division of labour within the society. Among
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other things, this restricts mobility for workers within the informal
sector and influences the interaction among workers from different
castes (United Nations Development Programme, 2009).
SEWA’s success in bringing such disparate individuals
together can be linked to three factors. First, the organization focuses
on women (a highly marginalized worker group). Ninety-four per
cent of the female labour force in India works in the informal sector
(SEWA, 2009b), and many studies show that targeting women
for assistance brings the largest positive feedback effects for the
family and community (Padgett and Warnecke, 2010). Second, the
organization emphasizes self-reliance and community-building.
This enables individuals to connect by developing locally-run and
sustainable provision of services, rather than remaining isolated and
relying solely on external assistance. Finally, SEWA approaches
organization holistically, “linking different levels, organizing,
building skills, developing institutions that serve the poor, bringing
the resources of modern knowledge to bear, focusing on systems,
and finding the kinds of partners and partnerships that can allow
members to move forward” (Marshall, 2010: 2).
The organization is now the largest union in India, with 1.2
million female members, and as it has grown it has increased the
variety of services it provides to attract a diverse body of informal
labourers (Marshall, 2010). In its home state of Gujarat, SEWA is
associated with a host of cooperatives, rural producers’ groups, and
social security organizations, in addition to a plethora of microfinance
and microcredit groups to serve members’ financial and credit
needs. As SEWA (2009c) notes, SEWA’s cooperatives range from
dairy, artisan, and land-based products to service/labor provision;
nearly 137,000 individuals are members of these cooperatives, with
more than 130,000 members in the service and labor cooperatives
alone. More than 3,000 individuals are members of rural producers’
groups; while most of these specialize in crafts, some focus on
land-based or forest-based products; distribution of food, grain and
essential items; or nursery-raising. Particularly significant is the fact
that 7,207 individuals have joined SEWA’s health and/or child care
service networks; such benefits are nonexistent for most informal
laborers, but these essential services reach 117, 119 SEWA members
and their families (SEWA, 2009c).
SEWA has also taken networking to a new level. It helped to
create international networks like WIEGO and played an important
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role in the ILO adoption of the Home Work Convention in 1996,
which promoted the equality of treatment of home workers with
other wage earners, in terms of remuneration, maternity protection,
work safety, right to organize, and many other benefits (Sundar,
2010; ILO, 1996). SEWA has also been instrumental in the creation
of StreetNet (an international network of national street vendor
organizations) and the National Alliance of Street Vendors of India.
The group’s lobbying played a major role in the Indian government’s
2009 revision of the National Policy for Street Vendors (Sundar,
2010). All of these successes can be traced to SEWA’s ability –
honed over time – to redefine the term ‘worker’ in India.
Indonesia
Similar to the Indian case, Indonesia’s trade union movement
in recent years has shown significant growth. In Indonesia, however,
this can be linked to the fall of Suharto’s regime in 1998. During
Suharto’s reign, only one trade union federation was permitted, with
strict oversight by the government. In many cases, union members
did not bargain with employers but simply begged. Yet with the
collapse of the dictatorship, the right to organize freely and openly
was restored (van Klaveren et al., 2010). The resulting trend toward
democratization then enabled the number of trade unions to expand
from one large umbrella organization under state control to over
80 private unions as of 2004 (International Centre for Trade Union
Rights [ICTUR], 2004).
However, unions must continue to fight for fair representation
and recognition by Indonesia’s reformed government. The new
unions initially began as underground organizations that focused
on social rights (eg. freedom of speech and freedom to organize
– wherever, whenever), attracting mass support from a loyal
following of informal workers. As these unions expanded their
objectives to include economic and social equality in the workplace,
the newly democratic Indonesia attempted to meet these pressing
demands by ratifying ILO labour regulations and incorporating
them as government mandated laws. Nonetheless, these changes
remained ineffective as they largely targeted formal sector workers,
disillusioning informal workers and causing their union membership
to decline (Social Alert, 2003: 15).
Older trade unions—those existing before 1998—focus
on traditional, more formal styles of bargaining by colluding
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with employers. Their main purpose is not necessarily for socioeconomic equality, but simply to gain the ability to collectively
bargain. While initially these older unions were solely comprised
of formal workers, they extended membership to a large percentage
of informal workers after democratization took place, assuming that
increases in numbers would garner greater negotiating potential.
Older unions are also favoured by authorities who appreciate the
unions’ “personal links with vested interest groups” (such as the
Ministry of Manpower), alliances with employers, and connections
to security forces; this enables the older unions to be “very good at
discrediting the new unions” (Social Alert, 2003: 17). Such factors
ensure that older unions’ demands are ranked higher than those of
the newer, more liberal thinking ones.
Instead of working together toward a common goal, the new
and old organizations force their members to compete against one
another for the same jobs and positions. Such infighting propagates
the notion that trade unions are in and of themselves ineffective,
keeping many informal workers from becoming members and thus
organizing in the first place. The actual percentage of workers
affiliated with unions remains low, with some 3.4 million workers
unionized constituting a mere four per cent of the total workforce
and 14 per cent of the formal work sector (ITUC, 2007: 3).
Although these numbers seem debilitating, changes in the
laws surrounding unions instill hope. Indonesia has ratified all
ILO core conventions and has committed to changing all standing
laws that contradict ILO statements. The Indonesian government’s
chief focus has been on the Worker’s Union / Labour Act (No. 21
of 2000), the Manpower Act (No. 13 of 2003) and the Industrial
Dispute Settlement Act (No. 2 of 2004). The Trade Union Act allows
workers from the private sector to organize, but trade unions must
have a minimum of ten members and must register with the Ministry
of Manpower in order to be officially recognized by the government
as a legitimate confederation (ITUC, 2007: 5).
Unions do maintain the right to collective bargaining, but
union leaders must first recruit or receive support from more than 50
per cent of the total workforce in that specific sector of the economy
(Ibid). The government’s Manpower Act affirms workers’ right
to strike, but only under a restricted set of conditions. More often
than not, strikes lend themselves to violence, giving employers the
opportunity to intervene using the military or police forces in an
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attempt to quell all forms of resistance (Ibid, 6). Informal sector
union members thus lose credibility as a respectable group worth
bargaining with and are instead showcased as violent extremists
with unrealistic demands.
Although discouraging unions from collectively bargaining
is legally subject to a fine or even imprisonment, in reality this does
not frequently occur. Like their Indian counterparts, Indonesian
employers often discriminate against union workers and simply
ignore standard legal procedures for hiring. While the unions may
take their case to court to be heard and tried, the process is lengthy
in Indonesia, taking up to six years—assuming that small informal
sector groups can afford to pay the fees charged by most lawyers
and judges, who are often bribed by the employer to rule in the
company’s favour (Social Alert, 2003: 13). Consequently, when
informal workers attempt to unionize they are dismissed on the spot,
being replaced by new low-skilled labourers resigning themselves to
the tasks at hand, no matter the pay.
The Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Act of 2004
attempted to remedy such corrupt practices rampant in the judicial
system by creating a bipartite system for negotiation. As of 2006,
union leaders from the informal sector and company heads are
required to first attempt to reach an agreement on their own accord.
If this process fails, a mediator is brought in to act as an intermediary.
Ultimately, the dispute may be brought before the Industrial
Relations Court with a verdict given within 50 days (ITUC, 2007:
6). However, even when union demands are granted via a courtordered sentencing, a common practice is for employers to simply
declare bankruptcy. In doing so, the company itself is dissolved and
then reformed a few days later under a newly registered name. This
in turn ensures that informal workers’ rights, while granted in court,
are simply circumvented in practice (Ibid: 7).
The Indonesian government has proved effective at being
the first Southeast Asian country to successfully ratify all eight core
ILO Conventions covering fundamental human rights (elimination
of forced labour, freedom of association, elimination of labour
discrimination, and abolition of child labour), yet the international
trade union community along with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) encourage stricter adherence to these conventions (IMF, 1999;
ITUC, 2011b)6. It is the role of the state not only to mandate new
laws, but also to ensure they are being enforced. In doing so, the IMF
144

along with NGOs have promised to keep a steady stream of foreign
investment flowing into Indonesia to spur economic development,
especially for the informal sector (ICTUR, 2004). Because increasing
informality is associated with less efficient labour markets (which
affect global competitiveness), the IMF has been pushing for ‘more
inclusive growth’ (IMF, 2011a; IMF, 2011b). For the IMF, this has
tended to mean expanded social safety nets, in addition to improved
health and education services and coverage; among other things, this
can help to remedy gendered imbalances in labour force participation
(IMF, 2011a). However, there is an element of contradiction between
the IMF’s theory and practice here. Even though the IMF calls for
inclusive growth, the process of attaining more inclusive growth can
be economically inefficient in the short run, which is difficult for the
IMF to handle. Additionally, other IMF policies (particularly those
affiliated with structural adjustment and the Washington Consensus)
have in fact contributed to the informalization and flexibilization of
the labor force (DeRuyter and Warnecke 2008)7.
One way that NGOs help to organize the informal sector
is by funneling capital into Indonesia through a proven method of
small, community-based micro-lending institutions (World Bank,
2001). These services are crucial for informal workers, given that
88 per cent of Indonesia’s workforce relies on some form of capital
loans in order to meet daily family and work demands (Social Alert,
2003: 10). In gaining access to resources (as well as proper training
on using those resources effectively and efficiently), individuals are
able to identify with one another and in turn collectively increase
awareness about their specific needs and goals. While the Indonesian
government initially branded NGOs as foreign ‘watchdogs’ and
expressed concern over their ability to organize informal sector
labourers, policymakers have since changed their view (Antlov et
al., 2005). In seeing the effectiveness of microfinance initiatives,
the Indonesian government attempted to support the informal sector
with its own National Bank (Bank RI) and the Social Credit Bank
(Bank Perkreditan Rakyat). However, poor management practices
and high expenses linked to corruption and legal restrictions caused
the system to buckle.
Apart from their role in micro-lending though, NGOs
remain influential by raising awareness of the injustices associated
with informal labour practices. NGOs have been particularly helpful
for Indonesian home-based workers, most of whom are women.
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The average earnings of home-based workers are lower than any
other (paid) informal worker group (Chen, 2003). In Indonesia, 42
NGOs collaborate with MWPRI (Mitra Wanita Pekeria Rumahan
Indonesia, also known as the National Network of Friends of Women
Homeworkers), altogether serving more than 19,000 homeworkers
in nine provinces (Pineda Onofreo, 2007). Approximately twothirds of these homeworkers are subcontracted, with the remainder
being self-employed (Ibid.).
Founded in 1999, MWPRI aims “towards a better life for
the women home-based workers…which is humane, just, gendersensitive, and progressive” (Ibid.). Specifically, the organization
aspires to offer social protection comparable to what those in standard
(formal) wage employment positions receive (MWPRI, 2008).
While in 2004 the Indonesian Parliament approved a National Social
Security System Law, the law did not include detailed provisions
for transitioning to this system (ILO, 2008a). Implementation and
enforcement have thus been lacking so home-based workers (along
with many other groups) have not received any benefits. While
MWPRI continues to pressure the government on this matter, the
network has also developed indigenous social protection schemes
offering health, savings and loan services (Pineda Onofreo, 2007).
MWPRI’s work is facilitated by its linkages with HomeNet,
a transnational network of NGOs focusing on the social welfare
of home-based workers. HomeNet “is able to provide local
homeworker unions with links to global organizing” – this includes
advocacy within ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (Hale, 2004: 159; See HomeNet Southeast Asia, 2010).
The organization has been known to intervene on legal matters as
well. While homeworkers are not technically mentioned in the
new laws introduced as part of Indonesia’s recent ratification of
the ILO declarations, HomeNet Indonesia “claims that these laws
can be interpreted to cover the workers or labourers in the puttingout system” (MWPRI, 2008). Accordingly, the organization rallies
around government declarations and ensures informal workers are
up to date on recent changes in regulations. In this way, MWPRI is
able to effectively combat injustices against women workers in the
informal sector.
Ultimately, the organization has been able to promote
the visibility of female home-based workers, encourage the
establishment and collaboration of local unions8, and foster belief
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in the emancipation of female workers as powerful and contributory
Indonesian citizens. Most of this is mainly attributable to MWPRI’s
collaborative efforts with governmental organizations, international
activists, academicians, and non-governmental organizations—all
in the hopes of encouraging a united front in the fight against homebased worker injustices.
Discussion
While the process of organizing informal workers faces
an array of barriers, the potential benefits from overcoming these
obstacles far outweigh the costs. By tapping into the strength of
numbers, organizing can diminish day-to-day vulnerability for the
majority of workers around the globe. This dimension of the politics
of labour empowers individuals to bring about positive changes in
their lives and those of their families.
While most informal labourers experience similar barriers
to organizing, it should be noted that country-specific factors such as
political history, cultural norms, and economic and political structure
influence the entire organizational process. Such was the case with
our exploratory analysis of India and Indonesia, where India’s
lingering caste system and Indonesia’s recent democratization played
a large role in dictating how informal workers effectively organized
and communicated with one another. It is crucial to think about a
country’s individual characteristics in order to implement appropriate
and relatable methods of surpassing organizational barriers. Because
of this, it becomes difficult to make broad, sweeping claims regarding
‘proven’ methods associated with overcoming these barriers and
successfully uniting groups of people.
Although there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to
organizing informal workers, we did observe general trends for
empowering those within the informal sector. For example, successful
organization of the informal sector requires an external program
in addition to an internal one (Global Labour Institute, 1999). To
accomplish this, networks at multiple levels—local, national, and
international—need to be utilized to their fullest capacity in order to
ensure that informal sector workers not only recognize themselves,
but also are recognized by others.
In focusing internally and locally, communities need to come
together to begin the process of identifying their fellow informal
workers and exchanging information. In doing so, these groups are
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able to unite on the principle of commonality of circumstance and
thus make a stand to gain the attention of national policymakers who
have all but forgotten about this sector of the economy.
In amassing large numbers of people, these collectives
court both internal, national attention and external, international
organizations. Informal workers thus raise awareness and spur the
international community to act on their behalf in their struggle for
socio-economic justice. Often times, external NGOs not only have
access to capital funding, but can promote the upholding of ILO
declarations in all countries that operate and trade in international
markets.
This two-pronged approach grants informal sector workers
a heightened degree of bargaining power in terms of affecting
change within their respective countries. The national government,
feeling compelled not only by its citizens but also by international
organizations, feels pressured (at least) to acknowledge the issue
facing the ‘invisible’ sector of its economy or (at most) ratify
laws that align with ILO core conventions. It is also crucial that
the national government, not merely state-run legislatures, uphold
these regulations to ensure that the laws manifest universally across
the entire citizenry. This promotes the centralization of labour
lawmaking and further develops enforcement capacity within
the informal sector. Such measures also facilitate the organizing
process, enabling informal workers to become a recognized entity
with certifiable claims toward socio-economic welfare—which
many of their formal sector counterparts already enjoy.
Endnotes
1.
2.
3.

John Folkerth, Crummer Graduate School of Business, Rollins College,
Florida, USA. E-mail: jfolkerth@rollins.edu.
Tonia Warnecke, Department of International Business, Rollins College,
Florida, USA. E-mail: twarnecke@rollins.edu
It is important to note that the informal sector represents one—not the
only—aspect of informality in the economy. Informalized labour also
exists within the confines of the formal economy—for example, through
casual, part time, and subcontracted workers (many of whom were
formerly retrenched)—and there is a grey area between these two aspects
of informality. While both dimensions of informality are significant, we
believe there are enough differences between them to warrant separate
research on each group. This is particularly the case when considering
the diversity of approaches for improving decent work opportunities.
Hence, we focus on the informal sector here, and leave the other
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4.

5.
6.

7.

8.

dimension for future research.
The ILO definition of vulnerable labour excludes many types of informal
workers, both workers not engaged in a wage-employment relationship
(e.g., owner-operators of micro- and household-based enterprises
and independent artisans) and “wage workers in enterprises that are
unincorporated and operate on very small scale, and often excluded
from labour law coverage and enforcement; disguised wage workers
such as subcontracted homeworkers, domestic workers hired by private
households, and casual and itinerant wage workers with multiple and
changing employers” (ILO 2008b: 55). This means that informal labour
is more widespread than the ‘vulnerable labour’ statistic illustrates. The
ILO (2012: 42) also notes three other limitations to the vulnerable labour
indicator: the unemployed are not included; having a job classified as
vulnerable does not necessarily mean that one faces high economic risk;
and having wage employment does not preclude someone from facing
high economic risk.
We realize that formal sector workers also comprise part of the working
poor; this is an issue for future research.
In response to growing criticism, the IMF has stepped up its collaboration
with the ILO in recent years, meeting more regularly with the ILO to
discuss crisis management policies and methods of designing “basic
social protection floors that are adapted to local realities and fiscally
sustainable” (US Treasury Department, 2012: 19).
In response to widespread criticism of its handling of the Asian financial
crisis, the IMF in 1999 established the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF) to make poverty reduction more central to its lending
objectives in developing countries (IMF 2008). It is not clear that
these institutional changes have empowered developing countries to
substantively improve the lives of their poor populations—particularly
women (Elson and Warnecke, 2011). Cammack (2009: 38) takes this idea
further, arguing that the international financial institutions’ prioritization
of inclusivity provides “ideological cover for a programme of universal
capitalist competitiveness that imposes transformative social change” and
creates an even stronger power hierarchy between capital and labor.
MWPRI played a major role in establishing an independent association of
female homeworkers in Indonesia (Himpunan Wanita Pekerja Rumahan
Indonesia, also known as HWPRI).
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